The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 49 | Number 3

Article 7

August 1982

The Hospital Response: The Morality of the
Civilian-Military Contingency Hospital System
Gerald D. Coleman

Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
Coleman, Gerald D. (1982) "The Hospital Response: The Morality of the Civilian-Military Contingency Hospital System," The Linacre
Quarterly: Vol. 49: No. 3, Article 7.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol49/iss3/7

The Hospi tal Response:
The Morality of the Civilian-Military
Contingency Hospital System
Gerald D. Coleman, S.S.

An associate professor of moral and pastoral theology at St.
Patrick's Seminary,- Menlo Park, California, Father Coleman holds a
doctorate {rom the Institute of Christian Thought in Toronto.

There is obviously no end to the debate and controversy regarding
nuclear warfare.!
The nuclear question sustains particular concern for the hospital
systems in this country as they have been called upon to help create
adequate preparation for the possibility of a war in the European
arena.
In his statement of Oct. 4, 1981, Archbishop John R . Quinn of San
Francisco specifically focused on the question of this medical involvement as preparedness for war. In the section of his pastoral letter, "St.
Francis of Assisi; · Instruments of Peace - Weapons of War," entitled
"Our Response," Archbishop Quinn wrote as a second area for concern and response:
.. . (S)ince many in the medical community are now convinced that it is
dangerously deceptive to pretend there can be an effective medical response
in the case of a thermonuclear attack, I urge the administrators and staff of
Catholic Health Facilities to join all those who are vigorously opposing the
intentions of the Department of Defe nse to establish a "Civilian-Military
Contingency Hospital System" if this System is based on the illusion that
there can be effective m edical response in the case of nuclear war. 2

The key phrase here, of course, is " ... if this System is based on
the illusion" of effective medical response to a nuclear war. This question lies at the heart of the moral dilemma concerning hospital cooperation in the Civilian-Military Contingency Hospital System (CMCHS).
Maj. Michael C. Vojtasko is the deputy director of the CMCHS and
he has responded to the question about "illusion" in very concrete
terms:
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The program has received the endorsement of the American Medical Association, American Hospital Association, and we are working closely with a
number of other national health associations and groups such as the American College of Emergency Physicians. It is unfortunate that some groups,
principally the Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), have attempted
to link the CMCHS program with nuclear war. Since the Department of
Defense has never stated this as a planning premise of the program, the PSR
alleges that this lack of association must mean that we are concealing our
real purpose. While we share the concern of all health professionals regarding the medical effects of nuclear war, and whether medical planning is even
feasible for such an eventuality, we object strongly to the use of the CMCHS
program as a vehicle to state an anti-nuclear policy. Attempts to do so
demonstrate, at best, a misunderstanding of the program and puts in
jeopardy the success of a logical, cost-effective system of care to Service
members who may become casualties from a future conflict. 3
, I

Major Vojtasko's statement recognizes clearly the danger of nuclear
war. At the same time, however, the statement exegetes the CivilianMiltary Contingency Hospital System as a program that is not aimed
at preparedness for nuclear warfare. It seems evident that the Department of Defense, cited here in Vojtasko's statement, is concerned
about preserving the conditions that make possible the continuation
of civilized life on earth. The question is answered as far as Vojtasko's
comment here: the CMCHS is not a program aimed at care in the
eventuality of a nuclear war.

Civilian-Military Contingency Hospital System

\1

..

In order to sustain a better perspective on the hospital response to
this program, it would be beneficial to outline the main elements
involved in the CMCHS_
First of ali, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is
an executive agency that serves as a single point of contact within the
federal government for emergency management activities. It is dedicated to the establishment and maintenance of a comprehensive and
coordinated emergency management capability in the United States to
plan and prepare for, respond and recover from and, most importantly, mitigate the effects of emergencies, disasters, and hazards
ranging from safety and protection in the home to nuclear attack.
Secondly, then, it is clear that the responsibility of the FEMA is to
make adequate preparation for "nuclear attack." What is equally as
clear, however, is that another option has been explored, a decision to
move toward the civilian sector for relief in the case of a nuclear
attack.
The CMCHS represents a decision, then, to construct a system in
peacetime which taps the civilian sector of hospital beds, facilities and
manpower. The assumption of this program is that the CMCHS would
be activated only in the event that military casualties generated in a
August, 1982
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war abroad would exceed the Department of Defense and Veterans'
Administration capability to care for these casualties.
It seems logical to conclude that the CMCHS is part of an overall
effort to prepare for any contingency so that American servicemen
and women can be assured of adequate medical care under all circumstances. The obvious question, however, remains outstanding: if the
FEMA functions as a federal agency to plan and prepare for the
effects of a nuclear attack, why duplicate this effort in the CMCHS?
One might respond to this question by stating that the object of
the FEMA program is to care for casualties at home, whereas the
CMCHS program is to care for the casualties suffered by American
servicemen and women abroad. According to Vojtasko, however, the
CMCHS does not assume that these casualties would arise from a
nuclear contest.
At this point, a brief history of the development of the CMCHS is
in order. The theory was first introduced to members of Congress in
the Spring of 1978, in Department of Defense testimony before Congressional committees on the FY 1979 Appropriations Bill for the
Department of Defense.
In subsequent years, congressional leaders expressed interest in the
progress of the program's development and implementation. In June
of 1980, the General Accounting Office released a report to Congress
on the results of its investigation of the program. The report recommended that Congress mandate a Civilian Military-Veterans' Administration Contingency Hospital System to meet the medical needs of
U.S. military casualties in wartime. When Department of Defense representatives visit a community to present the program to hospitals and
medical leaders, a letter is sent to each member of that community's
congressional delegation, inviting them to participate in the discussion.
In brief, Congress has been well aware of the CMCHS program from
its inception, and has had every opportunity to debate the issue and
discuss the Department of Defense strategy of gaining support from
the civilian community to care for wartime casualties.
The initial public announcement of the CMCHS plan came in early
1980, in an official Department of Defense press release. At that time,
the release was picked up by the wire services as well as several major
metropolitan newspapers throughout the country. The program then
became widely publicized in major newspapers and magazines, tabloids and medical journals.
Initial announcements were accompanied from the start by criticism that the CMCHS was de facto assuming preparedness for nuclear
warfare. This assumption has always been denied, however. Writing to
the New York Times on Nov. 10, 1981, John F. Beary III, M.D.,
acting assistant secretary of the Department of Health Affairs, Washington, D.C., said:
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With . . . protest against the CMCHS plan ... , groups are jeopardizing the
care of wounded soldiers who might serve in a future conventional conflict,
and therefore interfering with our national security . 4

As stated and interpreted by the Department of Defense, therefore,
the CMCHS program does not assume nuclear war preparedness; aims
at supplementing the capabilities of the military health care field;
involves the use of civilian hospitals and their delivery capabilities; and
serves as a mechanism of preparedness to medically support a future
conflict outside the United States. 5
The Hospital Response
There is a standard contract, a "Memorandum of Understanding,"
between the Department of Defense and a hospital which agrees to
participate in the CMCHS program.
This memorandum indicates in part in the first paragraph that:

• I

The weapons of modern warfare may now create heretofore unknown numbers of American casualties in a zone of war. This potential medical demand
makes it imperative that the Secretary of Defense seek additional sources of
medical care for U.S. servicemen and servicewomen in the time of a conflict.

The memorandum then binds the participating hospital to agree
that:
.. . upon notification during a state of national emergency as declared by
the President it will make available to the Department of Defense a
minimum of 50 to a maximum of 80 beds with all necessary treatment and
administrative processing as may be required for the patients hospitalized
therein; and, for its part, the Department of Defense agrees to compensate
at the hospital's regular charges ... for its patient care services at the time
said services are provided.

.

\

The final paragraph of the memorandum indicates that both the
hospital and the Department of Defense will plan for the admission,
treatment, hospitalization and discharge of the military patients and
that the hospital will participate in an "annual exercise of CMCHS
which will be approved by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation
of Hospitals."
There has been a growing discontent with the CMCHS program
among hospitals, an anxiety which centers mainly on the assumption
that the CMCHS plan is not a preparation for nuclear war.
In October of 1981, the administrator of Queen of the Valley
Hospital in Napa, California, retracted an earlier agreement to participate in the CMCHS program. The reason is clear:
Out of concern for th e international climate which increasingly seems to
accept nuclear war as a "rational" possibility, I must use this as an opportunity to express . .. my opposition to the country's escalating race to produce weapons for nuclear war . . ..

In December of 1981, the superior general, along with her Council
of the Sisters of Mercy, Burlingame, California, issued a lucid stateAugust, 1982
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ment directing health care facilities sponsored by the Sisters of Mercy
of Burlingame to refrain from signing the CMCHS program. This directive is based on the belief that conventional war would inevitably
escalate "to the use of ... tactical nuclear weapons." The statement
here cites both John Moxley, M.D., assistant secretary of defense for
health affairs and Secretary of State Alexander Haig as admitting the
possibility that the "use of tactical nuclear weapons cannot and
should not be ruled out" (Haig's statement). For the Sisters of Mercy,
then, agreement with the CMCHS program fosters the illusion that
nuclear war is an ethical option.
Also in December of 1981, University of California officials notified the Department of Defense that they would not permit the university's five major hospitals to reserve specific facilities for the care of
wounded soldiers if a major war broke out overseas. U.S. officials
explained this conclusion by stating that participation in the CMCHS
program is a violation of California's privacy laws, and, in addition,
U.C. hospitals already sustain programs which provide health care services in the event of a national emergency.
A final example includes the decision of the president of Mary's
Help Hospital, Daly City, California. The hospital rescinded its earlier
commitment to participate in the CMCHS program because" ... [we]
do not wish to deceive the public into thinking that there can be
effective medical response in the event of a thermonuclear
attack .... (A) future war could escalate to the point of using tactical
nuclear weapons .... "
These examples picture well the general reasons why many hospitals are refusing to participate in the CMCHS program:
1) the international climate increasingly accepts nuclear war as a
rational possibility;
2) in the U.S. there is an escalating race to produce weapons for
nuclear war;
3) conventional war would inevitably lead to the use of tactical
nuclear weapons;
4) hospitals already sustain programs to care for people hurt in a
national emergency; and
5) participation in the CMCHS program deceives the public into
thinking that there can be an effective response to a thermonuclear attack.
Department of Defense Response
The Department of Defense has responded in various ways to this
general decision on the part of many hospitals not to cooperate with
the CMCHS program.
In June of 1981, John H. Moxley III, M.D. called the CMCHS a
"contingency plan ... to ensure that appropriate medical care is avail226

Linacre Quarterly

c

able should we ever become engaged in an overseas conflict which
results in more casualties than we can care for within the Federal
health care system." Dr. Moxley then writes:
In principle, it [the CMCHS program 1 is designed to accommodate casualties which might result from a war involving modern, conventional weapons .
It is possible, of course, that such a war could escalate to the use of chemical or tactical weapons within a combat theater.

This same basic principle was enunciated by Moxley in May of 1981:
. .. (T)he most likely scenario for a future military conflict would be in an
overseas area using conventional weapons. This does not rule out the possibility that such a war could escalate to a tactical nuclear exchange and
planning must, of course, consider that possibility.

In November of 1981, J. Alexander McMahon, president of the
American Hospital Association defended the CMCHS program on
other grounds:
Rather than developing a standby military hospital system, this use of
civilian facilities makes good economic sense, and it is an excellent precedent in government-private cooperation . . . . The government of the United
States has decided that there must be a "medical response" to members of
the armed forces injured abroad, and to believe that refusal to participate in
the CMCHS can deter nuclear war is a position I cannot understand.

In January of 1982, Major V ojtasko wrote to the California Catholic Conference:
From its inception, the CMCHS was designed as a contingency plan to
respond to an overseas conflict using conventional weapons and does not
assume the treatment of casualties from a nuclear confrontation. The use of
the phrase "advanced weaponry" in some of the written material on the
program does not include nuclear weapons systems.

.

)

As a final example, Brigadier General William P. Winkler, Jr., M.D.,
commanding officer for the Department of the Army of Lettermen
Army Medical Center in the Presidio of San Francisco wrote this
response to the decision of Mary's Help Hospital in Daly City, California, to withdraw participation in the CMCHS program:
. .. (W)ar ... is a tragic waste of human life and human energies. I find no
moral difference between clubs, bullets or nuclear radiation when we are
talking about destroying young lives. You should realize that there are few
professional soldiers who do not share these views. One wonders why they
are then professional soldiers. It is perhaps an over simplification but I think
that the reason is an awareness that there comes a time in the course of
human events when political and diplomatic solutions are exhausted. At
that time, somebody must be willing to sacrifice himself for the benefit of
those who remain behind. You must realize that the military does not go to
war unless the President and the Congress send it. The military does not
defend the kind of war it must fight any more than the fireman defines the
kind of fire that he must fight. Like the fireman, we must be prepared for
all contingencies and on the day the fire starts, it is too late to prepare or
plan on how to put out the fire ....

August, 1982
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If our President and Congress find it necessary to commit U.S. soldiers to
battle, whether it be a large scale conflict in Europe or smaller scale in the
Persian Gulf or Central America, I can only conclude that large numbers of
casualties will be returning to the U.S. CMCHS is an attempt to be prepared
to adequately care for these soldiers who will have sacrificed themselves so
that others might enjoy th e ir peaceful pursuits here at home.

What conclusions can be drawn from these responses?
1) the CMCHS is a contingency plan to supplement federal health
care systems;
2) the CMCHS assumes the use of conventional weapons but
admits the possibility of escalation to the use of chemical or
tactical nuclear weapons;
3) it is economically more feasible to employ the CMCHS program;
4) the CMCHS program is an excellent precedent in governmentprivate cooperation; and
5) the CMCHS assumes the use of conventional weaponry and
abhors the use of war but recognizes that once war occurs, there
is "no moral difference" between conventional weapons and
nuclear warfare.
The Vatican and the Use of Nuclear Weapons
In October, 1981, under the chairmanship of Prof. Carlos Chagas,
president of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences (Vatican City), a
group of 14 specialized scientists from various parts of the world
assembled to examine the problem of the consequences of the use of
nuclear weapons on the survival and health of humanity. 6 This group
of scientists issued a statement which is a clear assertion that the
conditions of life following a nuclear attack would be so severe that
the only hope for humanity is prevention of any form of nuclear war.
Several quotations from this statement are pertinent:
Recent talk about winning or even surving a nuclear war must reflect a
failure to appreciate a medical reality : any nuclear war would inevitably
cause death , disease and suffering of pandemic proportions and without the
possibility of effective medical in terventions. That reality leads to the same
conclusion physicians have reached for life·threatening epidemics throughout history: prevention is essential for control ....
(N)o one could delive r the medical service required by even a few of the
severely burned, the crushed and the radiated victims ... .
The suffering of the surviving population would be without parallel.
There would be complete interruption of communications, of food supplies
and of water. Help would be given only at the risk of mortal danger from
radiation for those ven turing outside of buildings in the first few days. The
social disrupt.ion following such an attack would be unimaginable ....
Even a nuclear attack directed only at military fac ilities would be devastating to the country as a whole. This is because military facilities are
widespread rather than concentrated at only a few points. Thus, many
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nuclear weapons would be exploded. Furthermore, the spread of radiation
due to the natural winds and atmospheric mixing would kill vast numbers of
people and contaminate large areas. The medical facilities of any nation
would be inadequate to care for the survivors. An objective examination of
the medical situation that would follow a nuclear war leads to but one
conclusion: prevention is our only recourse ....
(W)here treatment of a given disease is ineffective or where costs are
insupportable, attention must be turned to prevention. Both conditions
apply to the effects of nuclear war. Treatment would be virtually impossible
and the costs would be staggering ....
1 I

Conclusions
It is apparent that the medical community and hospitals must confront this issue as one of the most significant moral concerns of all
time. A clear statement is already emerging from the medical sector of
society: the medical community is virtually impotent in offering any
type of meaningful response to a nuclear attack. Silence at this point
is a betrayal of ourselves and of our civilization.
It is eminently clear from the combined responses of the Department of Defense that although the CMCHS program as such assumes
only the use of conventional weaponry in a war, escalation to the use
of tactical nuclear weapons is possible. It is thus morally impossible to
think any longer that a "pure" conventional war is feasible, when
nuclear weaponry is de facto a back-up reality. Even admitting the
possibility of only a conventional war, escalation to the employment
of nuclear weapons is possible, as admitted by some members of the
Department of Defense; and this type of employment cannot per se be
limited to a tactical engagement.
.

•\

It is a fitting moral conclusion, then, that the CMCHS subtly
encourages preparations for a war of catastrophic proportions, a program which too easily gives the general public the impression that
there is an adequate medical response to war in the future, a war
which cannot be in fact solely limited to conventional warfare. The
CMCHS handbook admits that "a future large scale war overseas will
probably begin and end very rapidly and produce casualties at a higher
rate than any other war in history." Is it really morally possible to
differentiate the type of conflict described here from a nuclear war of
some type, especially when General Winkler has stated that he sees "no
moral difference between clubs, bullets or nuclear radiation .. . "?

In light of this discussion and the facts presented in this paper, the
threshold between conventional and nuclear violence is virtually nondistinguishable, thus making the stance of the scientists gathered at
the Pontifical Academy of Sciences eminently sensible: prevention is
our only recourse; prevention is a moral exigency of the highest order.
August, 1982
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Albert Einstein's insight has been frequently quoted in these
debates; it is worth repeating here:
The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything except our ways
of thinking. Thus we are drifting toward a catastrophe beyond comparison .
We shall require a substantially new manner of thinking if mankind is to
survive.

Achieving such a change in thinking is the key to survival in a
nuclear age. This thinking must be applied to the moral consequences
of the CMCHS program.
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